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a bstr act  This article reviews the various ways in which the later writings 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein have been employed to address the question “What is 
Art?” These include the family resemblance model, the cluster concept model 
and the form of life model. The article defends a version of the form of life 
approach. Also, addressed the charge that it would have been more profitable 
had aestheticians explored what Wittgenstein actually said about art instead 
of trying to extrapolate from his writings an approach to what Nigel Warbur-
ton calls the art question.
k ey wor ds  Wittgenstein, the art question, family resemblance, cluster con-
cept, form-of-life
I. Introduction
I am not a Wittgenstein scholar. I am a student of the philosophy of art. 
So what this article will discuss primarily is the influence of Wittgen-
steinian ideas on the philosophy of art. As has been noted by others,2 this 
influence is most evident regarding questions about the way or ways in 
which we go about identifying art. This, of course, is somewhat arrest-
ing, since this is not a topic that appears to concern Wittgenstein himself 
when he broaches the topic of art. Indeed, some observers have com-
mented that it might be more profitable for philosophers of art to attend 
to what Wittgenstein said about art rather than attempting to invent a 
Wittgensteinian approach to the issue of the identification of art. That, 
it has been suggested, would have brought something new, exciting, and 
even pathbreaking to the study of the philosophy of art.3 Instead, phi-
losophers of art have deployed Wittgenstein’s thought to their perennial 
obsession with the question of “What is art?” when they might, it has 
been recommended, have struck out in more promising heretofore un-
explored directions.
I agree that the Wittgenstein’s influence on philosophers of art has 
been to suggest ways in which to go about identifying art. In what fol-
lows, I will examine three approaches to this question that claim roots 
in Wittgenstein’s work. They are what might be called the family re-
semblance approach (which is most frequently associated with Morris 
Weitz), the cluster concept approach (which has been defended recently 
by Berys Gaut), and the forms of life approach (which, I believe, was first 
suggested by Richard Wollheim in his book Art and its Objects). Of the 
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three approaches, I favor the forms of life approach, not only as the most 
promising application of Wittgenstein’s thought to this problem, but also 
as at least part of the most effective solution to the question of how to 
identify art. To this end, I will attempt to expand and defend a modified 
version of the position introduced by Wollheim. 
But I will also address the charge that philosophers of art would have 
been better advised to explore what Wittgenstein had to say about art4 – 
that that would have opened up new and more fruitful avenues of philo-
sophical research. In contrast, I will maintain that (1) what Wittgenstein 
says about how we respond to art and conduct aesthetic debate is not as 
original as alleged, (2) that there is a standing branch of the philosophy of 
art concerned with the phenomena that fascinated Wittsgenstein, namely, 
metacriticism, and (3) that Wittgenstein’s conception of what goes on in 
the appreciation and criticism of art, although insightful as far as it goes, 
does not go far enough and, for that reason, is at least incomplete.
So what follows comes in four major parts, specifically: sections on 
the family resemblance approach, the cluster concept approach and the 
forms of life approach, followed by a brief and somewhat critical com-
ment upon the purported originality and fecundity of Wittgenstein’s re-
marks on aesthetics.
II. The Family Resemblance Approach
Although advanced by several thinkers, the family resemblance ap-
proach to identifying art is probably most frequently associated with 
Morris Weitz’s widely anthologized article “The Role of Theory in Aes-
thetics.”5 In that article, Weitz attempted to extrapolate from his under-
standing of Wittgenstein’s discussion of games to a position about the 
way in which to go about identifying artworks. It may seem odd that 
rather than focus upon what Wittgenstein said about art, Weitz con-
trived to use other parts of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to deal with an 
issue he never broached. But such behavior is common in aesthetics, as 
when in his best known articles, Clement Greenberg turned to Kant’s 
First Critique for constructing his theory of fine art rather than to his 
Third Critique.
Weitz’s article was quite ambitious. As is well known, it proposed an 
argument against what Weitz conceived of the traditional way of doing 
the philosophy of art, namely the attempt to define art. He also intro-
duced an alternative way of identifying art to the definitional approach, 
namely the family resemblance approach. And lastly, he offered a re-
conception of what traditional definitions were up to, thereby salvaging 
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what was valuable in them. In particular, he maintained that once the 
traditional theories of art were reconceived as art criticism – pointing to 
often neglected features of emerging art – supposed theories of art, like 
formalism, could be seen to make a salutary contribution to the apprecia-
tion of challenging, innovative art, like Neo-Impressionism.
Although Weitz notes that all attempts to define art in the past have 
failed, he does not rest his case against the possibility of defining art on 
inductive grounds. Rather, he believes that he can demonstrate logically 
the impossibility of the attempt by philosophers of art to construct theo-
ries of art in terms of identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for qualifying for the status of art. Weitz’s argument against the possi-
bility of defining art was called “the open-concept” argument. Basically 
the argument maintained that “the very expansive, adventurous charac-
ter of art, its ever-present changes and novel creations make it logically 
impossible to ensure any set of defining properties.”6 The thrust of this 
argument can be expanded formally as a reduction ad absurdam in the 
following manner:
1. Art is creative, constantly open to innovation.
2. If something is creative, constantly open to innovation, then it 
cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
3. Suppose that art can be defined.
4. Then art is not creative, constantly open to innovation.
5. Therefore art is not art.
Supposing that the open-concept argument is successful, it is incumbent 
upon Weitz to produce an alternative, nondefinitional way for identify-
ing art, since we obviously succeed in doing so. Imitating Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of games, Weitz maintains that the way in which we iden-
tify artifacts as artworks is by means of family resemblances. Taking 
some body of established artworks as paradigms, we assess new candi-
dates in terms of their resemblance to the paradigms. Abstractions by 
Mondrian are art because, like paradigmatic representational works by 
Poussin, they have a discernible compositional structure. The more simi-
larities between a candidate and paradigmatic artworks, the stronger 
the grounds for deciding that the former is an artwork. Moreover, the 
fact that there is a putatively successful alternative to the definitional ap-
proach provides additional grounds for abandoning it, especially in light 
of all of the successive attempts to discover the definition of art.
Finally, Weitz has some kind words for the various essentialist at-
tempts to define art. They failed to do what they tried to do; for, it couldn’t 
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be done, given the open-concept argument. But the theories concocted 
by these philosophers were not utterly uninformative. They were just 
not informative in the way in which their proponents imagined. Where 
they were valuable, they were valuable as art criticism, rather than as art 
theory. The expression theory of art, for example, may educate viewers, 
steeped in expectations of realism, in the emotive power of distortion, 
thereby enabling them to appreciate the value of a painting by El Greco. 
Perhaps ironically, this reconstruction of the value of traditional phi-
losophies of art may be the element of Weitz’s philosophy which is of 
lasting merit. For, the open-concept argument and the family resem-
blance approach are both embattled.
The open-concept argument is in trouble virtually every step of the 
way. The first premise – that art is creative, constantly open to innova-
tion – is dubious. One problem, among others, is that it is parochial. At 
times, especially in the West, we have prized art for being creative and 
innovative. That is certainly especially the case since the onset of the 
avant-garde in the nineteenth century. We fetishize, what Irving Howe 
once called, the tradition of the new. But there are periods in history 
and places where innovation was not considered the sine qua non of art; 
consider long stretches of Chinese art, not to mention our own middle 
ages. Indeed, in some situations, artistic innovation was considered the 
antithesis of the going art, as in the case of the realist interlude during 
the reign of Akhenaten in ancient Egypt.
Likewise, the second premise of the argument is troubling. For it is 
not the case that if something can be defined in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, that that precludes creativity and innovation. Both 
George Dickie’s earlier Institutional Theory of Art and its later incar-
nation as the Art Circle as well as the theory of art found in Danto’s 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace provide necessary and conjointly 
sufficient conditions for art, but there is no artistic innovation that they 
preclude. Indeed, Danto explicitly, and, I think, successfully argues that, 
on his view, art can look like anything. None of these theories block ar-
tistic creativity in any respect. So, there are theories that define art in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions that are not impediments to 
creativity. Therefore, the second premise is false.
But perhaps a deeper problem with the open concept argument occurs 
as we move from the first two premises to the third premise. For, it ap-
pears that in the first two premises when we speak of art, we are speak-
ing of the practice of art. Why? Because it makes sense to say that the 
practice of art is open to constant innovation. Individual artworks, save 
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various forms of environmental-process art may be open to innovation, 
but most individual artworks are not. Richardson’s Clarissa is not now 
open to innovation, nor is Leonardo’s Virgin and Child with Saint Anne. 
However, when we are asked to suppose that art can be defined in the 
third premise of the argument, it would appear to be the case that we 
are supposed to be thinking in terms of individual artworks, since this 
is typically what traditional art theorists like Clive Bell were attempting 
to define. Yet, if premise three is about defining artworks, then art in 
that premise is not referring to that which art refers in the first premise. 
Moreover, the upshot of this equivocation is that the argument fails to 
secure a contradiction, since there is no absurdity in asserting that art 
qua practice is not the same as art qua individual artwork.
Of course, the problems with the family resemblance approach are 
even better appreciated than the problems with the open-concept argu-
ment. The approach recommends choosing a set of paradigms against 
which to measure candidate works in terms of the affinities they bear 
to the paradigms. However, we are not given instructions about how 
to assemble the class of paradigms. So, at the very least, the family re-
semblance approach is radically incomplete. Moreover, the paradigms 
possess a large number of properties, presumably many of which are 
artistically irrelevant. Kliest’s Marquise of O is written in German, but 
that provides no grounds for thinking that a recent issue of the Ber-
liner Zeitung is an artwork because it resembles Kliest’s masterpiece in 
respect of its language. Here the ready solution might appear to be to 
specify exactly in what ways candidates have to resemble the paradigms, 
yet that seems like a return to laying down definitional conditions. But 
without any constraints on which resemblances count, the family resem-
blance approach will lack the means to segregate artworks from every-
thing else, since everything resembles everything else in some respect. 
Alien sex toys will resemble Michelangelo’s David with respect to being 
material objects, as well as in an indefinitely large number of other art-
irrelevant properties, but that is scant reason to think them art. And, the 
same for virtually everything else in the universe.
Given the inadequacies of the family resemblance approach, let me 
turn to the cluster concept approach.
III. The Cluster Concept Approach
The cluster concept approach has been developed by Berys Gaut.7 Gaut 
claims inspiration from Wittgenstein’s discussion of the proper name 
“Moses”, to wit: “By ‘Moses’ I understand the man who did what the Bible 
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relates of Moses, or, at any rate, a good deal of it. But how much? Have I 
decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my proposi-
tion as false?”8 Following Searle’s refinement of this notion with respect 
to proper names, Gaut characterizes a cluster concept as one according to 
which there are multiple criteria for the application of a concept, none of 
which, however, is necessary. 9 That is, more precisely: “A cluster account 
is true of a concept just in case there are properties whose instantiation 
of an object counts as a matter of conceptual necessity toward falling 
under the concept.”10 
On Gaut’s conception of a cluster concept, there are several criteria for 
the application of a concept. If all the relevant criteria are instantiated, 
the object falls under the concept; that is, the sum total of the criteria are 
jointly sufficient for subsumption under the concept. As well, the dis-
junctive set of all the relevant criteria are disjunctively necessary for the 
application of the concept, although no individual criterion is necessary. 
Moreover, even if fewer than all of the pertinent criteria obtain, that may 
still be sufficient for the concept applying to the object.11
Like Weitz, Gaut regards the cluster concept approach as non-defi-
nitional, since he denies that there is any set of individually necessary 
conditions which are also conjointly sufficient for art status. A cluster 
concept is not, in other words, a real or essential definition.
Employing this structure with respect to the concept of art, Gaut main-
tains that the pertinent cluster of criteria with regard to the application of 
the concept of art are: (1) that x possess positive aesthetic properties; (2) 
that x be expressive of emotion; (3) that x be intellectually challenging; 
(4) that x be formally complex and coherent; (5) that x have the capacity 
to convey complex meanings; (6) that x have a point of view; (7) that x be 
the result of an exercise of a high degree of skill; (8) that x be the result of 
an exercise of imagination; (9) that x be a member of a recognizable art 
form; (10) that x be the product of an intention to create a work of art.12
In contrast to traditional approaches to identifying art, the cluster 
concept enumerates a large number of potential criteria for art status, 
whereas past theories of art usually emphasized one or two conditions 
for art status. Thus, the cluster concept approach has more heuristic pow-
er than its traditional predecessors just because it countenances more 
dimensions of artistic creation and appreciation. Thus, it situates art in 
an expanded field.
Nevertheless, as conceptually complex as the cluster concept approach 
is, I think that the version that Gaut presents is still unconvincing. Ac-
cording to Gaut, if an object satisfies all of the criteria he enumerates then 
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that is sufficient for a candidate to count as an artwork. But is that so? 
Consider this counterexample.
A baker makes a cake to commemorate his anniversary of his mar-
riage to his wife. They initially celebrated that event by taking a car trip 
during which they visited many cities. So the baker makes the cake in 
the shape of their car. Since his wife is an amateur cryptographer, he 
notes each of the cities they visited in alternating colors, along with re-
marks about what they saw there in code on the side of the cake. Argu-
ably, since our cook regards baking as an art, this cake meets all of Gaut’s 
criteria for art status, although this is not a result that most art lovers and 
philosophers of art would abide by.
The cake possesses positive aesthetic properties; it is pleasing to the 
eye. It expresses an emotion, namely love. It is intellectually challenging; 
it is in a non-obvious code. It is formally complex and coherent – the 
name places and accompanying observations are in alternating colors. It 
has the capacity to convey complex meanings, an affectionate history of 
the beginnings of their marriage. It has a point of view: that of the baker 
in love. It evinces great skill and imagination – there never was an an-
niversary cake like this one before. It belongs to a recognizable art form, 
specifically sculpture. And the baker intended it to be a work of art. But I 
doubt that few cognoscenti would accept it as such. Thus, Gaut’s version 
of the cluster concept of art fails on its own terms.
Gaut also maintains that his ten criteria are disjunctively necessary for 
art status. That too may be disputed. There are interpretations of Duch-
amp’s readymades that deny that Duchamp intended them as anything 
more than artworld pranks. That is, he did not intend them to be art-
works nor did he intend them to make any challenging or complex state-
ments. At the same time, something like his industrially produced, ca-
nine grooming comb lacks positive aesthetic qualities, evinces no great 
skill in its production, expresses no emotion, lacks a formal structure of 
the relevant sort, belongs to no recognizable art form and possesses no 
point of view. Suppose that all of this, as some have maintained, is true. 
Nevertheless, such works have still been accorded art status. Thus, it is 
at least possible that the entire set of criteria advanced by Gaut as consti-
tuting the cluster concept of art is not disjunctively necessary. So again, 
Gaut’s version of the cluster concept of art fails.
Gaut’s response to this, I predict, will be to say, as he has in the past, 
that even if his version of the cluster concept of art fails, that does not 
imply that the cluster concept approach to identifying art has failed. His 
only purpose was to show that the cluster concept approach may be a 
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promising line of inquiry to explore in the search for a viable avenue for 
identifying candidates as artworks.
However, saying that demonstrating the failure of his version of the 
cluster concept approach does not preclude the possibility that some clus-
ter concept approaches may succeed is not very compelling dialectically, 
since one can say, with equal logical propriety, that showing that this or 
that definitional approach fails, does not preclude the possibility that 
some version will succeed some day. Both claims are equally lackluster. 
In both cases, the burden of proof shifts to the proponent of the approach 
in question. That is, the definitionalist must come up with a convincing 
definition, while someone like Gaut must come up with a persuasive clus-
ter concept. Failure to do so in either case, compromises the approach in 
question, suggesting that we look for another way in which to go about 
identifying art.
So, with that in mind, let me now turn to the forms of life approach.
IV. The Forms of Life Approach
The best known statement of the forms-of-life approach occurs, I believe, 
in section 45 of Richard Wollheim’s Art and its Objects.13 There, Woll-
heim asserts, that “Art, in a Wittgensteinian sense, is a form of life.” I con-
cede that this is a controversial interpretation of what Wittgenstein may 
have meant by the notion of “a form of life.” Newton Garver would chal-
lenge Wollheim’s understanding of this concept inasmuch as he believes 
that the phrase refers to human life in general. Others might argue that 
art is at best part of a form of life. Since I am not a Wittgenstein scholar, 
I will not enter this dispute. Rather, I begin with the assumptions that 
Wollheim’s view is a reasonable, though perhaps not textually definitive, 
understanding of Wittgenstein’s conception, and that Wollheim’s articu-
lation of this notion is widely shared among philosophers of art, albeit, 
perhaps, because of Wollheim’s championing of this interpretation.
For Wollheim, the conviction that art is a form of life has a number of 
interesting consequences. One is that “art is essentially historical.” That 
is, the way in which to understand an evolving form of life -- the way in 
which to grasp its unity -- is to comprehend its history. For, among other 
things, it is by means of understanding the history of a form of life that 
we are able to specify a method for identifying artworks in a manner 
that is not definitional. Instead ascertaining membership in the relevant 
form of life is a historical matter.
Wollheim’s suggestion about the way in which to go about doing this 
is as follows: “the method might take this form: that we should, first, 
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pick out certain objects as original or primary works of art; and that we 
should then set up some rules which, successively applied to the original 
works of art, will give us (within certain rough limits) all subsequent 
or derivative works of art.”14 I believe that with certain modifications, 
including augmentations, Wollheim’s proposal can be shown to be one 
– I stress the singular here – method for identifying candidates as art 
works. Moreover, this method should be especially attractive to Wittgen-
steinians, since it reflects the way in which the denizens of this form of 
life – which was christened as the artworld by Wollheim’s colleague at 
Columbia University, Arthur Danto – actually go about establishing that 
candidates are artworks.
Mention of Danto here warrants a short detour for the purpose of dis-
tinguishing Danto, and for that matter Dickie’s, artworlds from Woll-
heim’s forms of life. Danto claimed that establishing candidates to be art 
works involved connecting them to an atmosphere of art theory and art 
history. One problem with Danto’s early formulation was an apparent 
overemphasis on the role of theory. Too much art appeared to be created 
without the benefit of theory and, in any event, there was also some ques-
tion about what would constitute an art theory. Indeed, can this be done 
without courting circularity?
 Like Wollheim, Danto would have been better off highlighting the 
importance of history and, again like Wollheim, invoking that which 
Danto regarded as enfrancishing art theories as operating as elements 
of the internal history of the art world. However, even with that emen-
dation, Danto’s approach would have differed from Wollheim’s, since 
Danto, at least until the publication of After the End of Art, wanted 
appeal to the atmosphere of the artworld to figure as a necessary condi-
tion in his definition of art, as propounded in his Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace.
Simlarly, although there are some correspondences between both 
Dickie’s earlier Institutional Theory of Art and his later account of the 
Art Circle, including the importance that he, like Wollheim, lays on the 
reciprocal relationship between the artist and his audience, nevertheless, 
Dickie’s approach differs from Wollheim inasmuch as Dickie remains 
committed to definition as the means for identifying art whereas Woll-
heim, in what he believes to be the spirit of Wittgenstein’s anti-defini-
tionalism, eschews it. Thus, although Wollheim, Danto, and Dickie, each, 
in different ways, aspired to secure the identification of artworks in an 
expanded field – including that of the history and practices of the art-
world – Danto and Dickie aspired to achieve this in terms of definitions 
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of the art work, whereas Wollheim proposed doing it by means of a non-
definitional method.
As we have seen, that method involves presuming that we know cer-
tain historical works are artworks and then tracing prospective candi-
dates for the status of artworks back to these primary artworks in virtue 
of certain rules. One modification to Wollheim’s approach here that I 
would recommend is to abandon talk of rules in this regard and to speak 
instead of certain recurring scenarios. That is, the way in which we con-
nect what Wollheim calls the derivative art works to the primary ones is 
by means of certain narratives that show how the later works emerged 
from the earlier ones.
A form of life, as I think Wollheim understood it, is a structure of 
possible moves. The game of chess stipulates the general ways in which 
certain chess pieces can move; then the disposition of pieces at a given 
point in any chess game further constrain the range of viable movement. 
Within the artworld form of life, the course of artistic development is 
both facilitated and constrained by the antecedent conditions of history. 
One example that Wollheim mentions is what he calls supersession. He 
remarks “… in the art of our day one work of art generates another by su-
persession of its most generative or its overall properties, e.g., Pont-Aven 
as the successor of Impressionism, hard-edge painting as the successor 
of abstract expressionism.”15 Here, of course, it is strained to think of 
supersession as a generative rule. Rather, as I have already suggested, it 
is more profitable to construe it as a scenario, or narrative type or genre, 
or story form.
Expanding upon Wollheim’s comments on supersession, the story, I 
think, goes like this: abstract expressionism exploited strategies of busy-
ness and messiness for expressive purposes. Pollack’s use of the drip is 
an example here. This, in turn, generated an almost predictable reaction 
formation in the next wave of artists who emphasized hard-edged pat-
terns, such as the neatly linear, geometrical forms of certain minimalist 
painters who bracketed subjectivity in favor of an aura of objectivity.
The narrative of the reaction formation is a recurring genre with re-
spect to modern art. It was mobilized once again to explain the emer-
gence of post modern art which was said to be a reaction to the austerity 
of minimalism which was accused of banishing concern with non-paint-
erly content, like politics.
If I interpret Wollheim correctly, he believes that we identify candi-
dates as artworks – such as early hard-edge paintings – by means of art 
historical narratives, such as the story-form of supersession to which he 
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alludes. That is, when a candidate seems likely to threaten prevailing 
expectations about art, a narrative, like that of supersession, is invoked 
in order to show the ways in which the candidate follows from or is gen-
erated by some antecedent artworld conditions – which, in the modern 
artworld, would appear to include the abiding pressure “to make it new.”
In this matter, I think that Wollheim can be defended on solid Witt-
gensteinian grounds. Namely, this is one way in which players in the art-
world language game, conceived of in terms of a form of life, do actually 
go about establishing that a candidate is an artwork. Stories, like that of 
supersession, may be told after a candidate arrives on the scene and some 
skeptic challenges its status as art. But quite often the story is told, so to 
speak, proleptically in manifestos by the prospective artists or in critical 
pieces by advocates of the new work. One need only look to the leading art 
magazines, gallery catalogues and the like in order to confirm that this is a 
recurring move in the language game of the artworld form of life.
Of course, supersession is not the only available move in this language 
game. New artworks emerge from past work through a number of dif-
ferent processes and are, in consequence, identified by various different 
narrative strategies. At the most fundamental level of artistic transfor-
mation from earlier art to successive art, the process is one of repetition, 
albeit typically with studied variations. Art at time T2, for example, may 
repeat the basic ingredients of its predecessors (at time T1), but, in addi-
tion, may simplify them, exaggerate them, or elaborate upon them. For 
instance, the Corinthian column is basically a column, but one that elab-
orates on its earlier Doric and Ionic models. Likewise, one may embrace 
the structures of a certain form of art while adding or subtracting from 
them. George Blanchine maintained the figures of the classical ballet, but 
added unprecedented speed to their execution.
Another way in which later art plays off of earlier art involves the 
subsequent work from one art form appropriating données and devel-
opments from another artform as the ballet Giselle helped itself to mo-
tifs from German Romantic poetry and when Nijinsky imitated ancient 
Egyptian imagery to create the angularity of the postures in his After-
noon of the Faun. Repetition of this sort, which I call the interanima-
tion of the arts, often occurs when the avant-garde of one artform apes 
parallel developments in the avant-garde of another artform as when 
minimalist choreographers of the early seventies, like Lucinda Childs 
and Laura Dean, with their repetitive, regular movement patterns, with 
slight accentual variations, echoed the minimalist music of composers 
like Steve Reich and Philip Glass.
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Repetition in various forms is one of the ways that later art is gener-
ated by earlier art and a narrative of one of these types is a way in which 
one might go about establishing that some newer candidate belongs to 
the order of art. On the face of it, this may seem like a reversion to the 
family resemblance approach, but it is not, because the repetition sce-
nario is not simply a matter of taking note of a resemblance between 
earlier and later works; it requires a causal connection – a line of influ-
ence or lineal descent – as well. Although when later art repeats, albeit 
with variations, ingredients from antecedent art, we rarely have cause to 
explicitly establish its art status – since the relation between the two is 
usually evident. Nevertheless, if called upon to justify the attribution of 
art status to certain works, one strategy for doing so is the narrative of 
repetition, as when one points to the use of Renaissance deep space in 
many of Dali’s otherwise enigmatic paintings.
In addition to narratives of repetition, there are also those of amplifica-
tion. Amplification involves a transition from one stage of art historical 
development to another where the later stage solves some problem that 
beset the earlier stage. Picasso’s use of collage – his attaching objects to 
the surface of a painted panel – for example, can be represented as a solu-
tion of how to call attention to and acknowledge the perceived, dual ex-
istence of paintings as simultaneously two and three dimensional. Thus, 
challenged to establish the art status of Picasso’s 1926 Guitar – a collage of 
canvas, wood, rope, nails, strings, newspaper, tacks and knitting needle 
on a painted surface – one would point out that this combination of real 
objects and a painted surface was a way of negotiating a problem that 
loomed large in the earlier avowed masterpieces of Cubist art, not only 
those of Picasso by also those of Braque, and, as well, in pre-Cubist paint-
ing, including classic works by Manet and Cézanne.
Hybridization is another artworld narrative that enables us to iden-
tify emerging candidates as artworks, as well as contested works of the 
past, in light of their predecessors. Early performance art, notably Hap-
penings, involve the transposition of the concerns of painting to a three 
dimensional arena whereas installation art may mash up an array of art 
forms ranging from sculpture and architecture, to video, photography 
and the essay. In the case of hybridization, pre-existing art forms and 
media – often along with their associated preoccupations – are combined 
to make something new, although recognizably descended from previ-
ously acknowledged, going artistic concerns.
I have replaced Wollheim’s notion of supersession with a more var-
iegated list of art historical scenarios because I, as I suppose Wollheim 
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would agree, believe that there are many more than one narrative type 
available for identifying art. One scenario that I have not discussed yet, 
but which seems to me the closest one to Wollheim’s example of super-
session is what I call repudiation. This is a recurrent gesture especially in 
the art of the twentieth century and now our own. 
Repudiation involves emerging artists making work that rejects reign-
ing art practices and their assumptions and biases in favor of a new 
artistic regime as when expressionists abjured realism and its commit-
ment to objective verisimilitude. This is revolutionary art. However, it 
is important to remember that even the most revolutionary art does not 
sever its relation to the past entirely. At the same time that the German 
expressionists embraced distortion and repudiated realism, they simul-
taneously appealed to precedents among recognized masterpieces in the 
tradition such as Mathias Grunewald’s Isenhim Altarpiece in which the 
figure of the crucified Christ is twisted unnaturally for expressive effect. 
Practitioners of repudiation not only assault dominant artforms of the 
present, but, at the same time, strike alliances with selected art of the 
past in order to recuperate dimensions of that art, such as expressive-
ness, that have been allegedly neglected or even repressed in the art that 
the emerging artists aspire to replace. Thus the art historical narrative of 
repudiation not only illuminates what the new candidates reject, but also 
its art historical predecessors and inspirations as a way of establishing 
the unity and the continuity of the artworld form of life.
So far I have enumerated several art historical narratives – or genres 
– which can be deployed for the purpose of identifying/establishing can-
didates as artworks, including repetition (in several forms including the 
interanimation of the arts), amplification, hybridization, and repudia-
tion. I do not claim that this exhausts the available identifying narra-
tives. Future study will undoubtedly benefit from close attention to the 
language games that are actually in operation in the artworld form of 
life. Nor would I want to deny that these identifying narratives can be 
conjoined and maybe even combined on particular occasions in various 
different ways for the purpose of demonstrating the art status of emerg-
ing work or historically contested work.
As Gregory Currie notes “Narratives are artefactual representations 
which emphasize the causal and temporal connectedness of particular 
things, especially agents; they are exquisitely suited to the representation 
of motive and action.”16 The identifying narratives that I have introduced 
as a way of filling out Wollheim’s Wittgensteinian conception of the ways 
in which artworks are identified in the form of life of the artworld are 
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agent-centered. These narratives strive to represent the relation of the ac-
tions and intentions of emerging artists to their heritage in a way that 
shows them to be involved in an intelligible continuation of that tradition. 
The means available for demonstrating that continuity include at least 
the narratives of repetition, including interanimation, amplification, hy-
bridization, and repudiation. 
The artist is a person who arrives at some juncture in the history of 
the artworld resolved to continue the practice by creating something 
which either re-enacts, with variations, the basic données of the practice 
or which re-directs it. The artist chooses her means for implementing 
her commitment on the basis of a plausible assessment of the state of the 
artworld and of the alternative, existing choices for realizing her aims. 
These choices, of course, run the gamut from elaborate repetitions to 
repudiations. Identifying narratives track these choices, and, where sup-
ported by the facts, establish these choices as artworks by representing 
them as the outcomes of art-generating actions.
Let me conclude this section of my talk by attempting to dispel three 
objections to this framework for identifying art which might have oc-
curred to you. First, you may be worried that this account makes it too 
easy to establish any candidate as an artwork, since these narrative forms 
can be imposed willy-nilly on any string of events. However, I maintain 
that the identifying narratives that I have in mind are genuine historical 
narratives and, to that extent, they must fit the facts as they stand. More-
over, this guarantees that these narratives cannot be spun at will, since 
they will have to square with all of the salient facts.
Second, you may suspect that this approach leaves too much to the 
artist’s conception of the situation. What if he has an off-the-wall take 
on the art historical situation and the alternatives therein? Here, I want 
to re-emphasize that we are talking about plausible artistic assessments 
and that that will protect us from absurd results.
Last, you might notice that this cannot be the only way in which we 
identify candidates as artworks, since there may be things, like prehis-
toric cave paintings, that are recognized as artworks but which are not 
susceptible to the narrative approach. That is true. That is why I began 
by emphasizing that this is one way we have for identifying artworks. 
There are others. However, it seems to me that the narrative approach is 
perhaps the most prominent way we have for establishing candidates to 
be artworks in our ongoing artworld form of life. Furthermore, I contend 
that this was what Wollheim was getting at with his appeal to Wittgen-
stein at the end of the first edition of his Art and Its Objects.
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V. Wittgenstein and Appreciation
 So far I have briefly addressed a few objections to the narrative frame-
work for identifying art. But another objection – one I referred to in my 
opening remarks – charges that mining Wittgenstein for a solution to the 
problem of identifying art fails to make contact with what Wittgenstein 
had to say about art and, moreover, were attention paid to Wittgenstein’s 
express concerns about art, the philosophy of art would be enriched be-
yond the aesthetician’s obsessive and perhaps sterile preoccupation with 
the question “What is Art?”
The parts of Wittgenstein at issue here are his comments on aesthet-
ics in his Lectures on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religion and the essay 
“Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-1933” by G. E. Moore.17 The relevant pas-
sages concern what might be called aesthetic appreciation or aesthetic 
judgment. Wittgenstein stresses that the notion of beauty is rarely perti-
nent when it comes to rendering aesthetic judgments. More often we are 
concerned with what is right (or wrong), appropriate (or inappropriate) 
with regard to a composition. Furthermore, when we disagree about the 
appropriateness of a composition, Wittgenstein proposes that we man-
age those disagreements by what I shall call demonstrative and compara-
tive criticism.
According to Moore, Wittgenstein maintained that
Reasons in Aesthetics are “of the nature of further descriptions,” e.g., you can 
make a person see what Brahms was driving at by showing him lots and lots 
of pieces by Brahms; or by comparing him with a contemporary author; and 
all that Aesthetics does is “draw your attention to a thing, “ to place things 
side by side.”18
That is, Wittgenstein emphasizes the dialogical dimension of aesthetic 
disagreement. Aesthetics is or should be concerned with particular art 
works and the appreciation thereof and when we disagree about said 
works, the aesthetician should elucidate the ways in which we can con-
duct those disagreements in a persuasive manner. Two strategies that 
Wittgenstein recommends are gesturing to certain details in a work, 
or perhaps to the relations between various details in the work saying, 
perhaps, look here and then there -- until your interlocutor grasps your 
point. This gesturing can be literal – a matter of ostension – or by means 
of words and descriptions, including metaphorical ones. This is demon-
strative criticism. Its aim is to get your interlocutor to see things. 
Comparative criticism involves getting others to see your point by 
comparing the work of art in questions with further works, either by 
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the same artists or by other artists. Think of the old two-projector lec-
tures in the art history classes of yesteryear. Works are juxtaposed in 
such a way as to make convergences and differences leap out. That too 
is a way to persuade another to see the work as you see it. It is a matter 
of showing. 
Wittgenstein, it has been said, opened up this unexplored area of aes-
thetics upon which, unfortunately, philosophers of art did not follow up, 
preferring to remain mired in the question of “What is art?” Commenta-
tors like Kjell Johannessen,19 suggest that it would have been more fruit-
ful had philosophers of art built upon these unprecedented remarks by 
Wittgenstein rather than in using Wittgenstein in the way they did in 
pursuit of their enduring questions.
But I disagree with this assessment for several reasons. 
First, Wittgenstein’s remarks about criticism were not unprecedented. 
Consider these observations by Clive Bell:
A good critic may be able to make me see in a picture that had left me cold 
things that I had overlooked, till at last, receiving the aesthetic emotion, I 
recognize it as a work of art. To be continually pointing out those parts, the 
sum or rather the combination , of which unite to form significant form, is the 
function of criticism. But it is useless for a critic to tell me that something is 
a work of art; he must make me feel it for myself. This he can only do by by 
making me see; he must get at my emotions through my eyes.20
Here Bell, like Wittgenstein a fellow acquaintance of Moore, is contend-
ing that critical disputes be settled by demonstrative criticism, such as 
pointings. If we disagree that a candidate lacks significant form – which 
would seem to be something like Wittgenstein’s notion of appropriate-
ness – we must show it to our interlocutor in a way in which he or she 
grasps it – sees it in a compelling manner – gripped viscerally by a feel-
ing of aesthetic emotion. Moreover, it seems likely that Bell would be 
happy to include among the strategies of pointing description, including 
metaphorical description , and comparison, so long as they enable the 
critic to make us apprehend what is appropriate (and inappropriate) in 
a particular artwork. Thus, Wittgenstein’s observations about aesthetic 
judgment are not unprecedented. 
Furthermore, it is not the case that subsequent philosophers of art 
abandoned these concerns of Wittgenstein and Bell. For, these con-
cerns fall under the label of metacriticism. Moreover, there are meta-
critics who would appear to be kindred spirits to Bell and Wittgenstein, 
such as Sibley and Isenberg.
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I do agree that the recognition of the importance of demonstrative 
criticism and comparative criticism is a major contribution to the philo-
sophical understanding of our engagement with artworks. At the same 
time, however, I would argue that this is not all there is to criticism or to 
appreciation. For there is an extremely significant dimension of appre-
ciation and criticism that these two practices do not encompass. What I 
have in mind is what we can call in general purpose-driven criticism of 
which thematic criticism is one of the most common sorts.
Purpose-driven criticism involves hypothesizing a purpose or set of 
purposes to a work so that the unity of the artwork becomes apparent as 
we realize that the parts hang together or work together in order to real-
ize an overarching purpose. Often the purpose in question is the commu-
nication of a theme. Postulating a certain theme as the aim that a certain 
artwork is committed to promote is one of the most popular and effective 
way in which critics and appreciators alike come to understand why the 
characters, incidents, plot conflicts, descriptions, and so on in a work 
have been chosen and fit together. Themes colligate the parts of a work 
under a concept or a set of concepts. Unlike demonstrative criticism or 
comparative criticism, purpose-driven criticism, including theme-driven 
criticism, is much more a matter of theorizing (with a small t) than sim-
ply an exercise in seeing.
Thus, to the extent that Wittgenstein neglected the relevance of these 
sorts of criticism, his account of aesthetic appreciation and judgment, 
although laudable as far as it went, is and was incomplete. Moreover, 
this incompleteness, added to the fact that Wittgenstein’s remarks were 
hardly unprecedented, suggest that subsequent philosophers of art may 
not have been completely unjustified in exploring other ways in which to 
apply Wittgenstein’s thought to the philosophy of art. 
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